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Abstract— Full-duplex communication enables simultaneous
transmission from both ends of a communication link, thereby
promising significant performance gains. Generally, it has been
shown that the throughput and delay gains of full-duplex com-
munication are somewhat limited in realistic network settings,
leading researchers to study other possible applications that can
accord higher gains. The potential of full-duplex communication
in improving the physical-layer security of a communication
link is investigated in this contribution. We specifically present
a thorough analysis of the achievable ergodic secrecy rate and
the secrecy degrees of freedom with full-duplex communication
in the presence of a half-duplex eavesdropper node, with both
single-user decoding and multi-user decoding capabilities. For
the latter case, an eavesdropper with successive interference
cancellation and joint decoding capabilities is assumed. Irrespec-
tive of the eavesdropper capabilities and channel strengths, the
ergodic secrecy rate with full-duplex communication is found
to grow linearly with the log of the direct channel signal-to-
noise-ratio (SNR) as opposed to the flattened out secrecy rate
with conventional half-duplex communication. Consequently, the
secrecy degrees of freedom with full-duplex is shown to be two
as opposed to that of zero in half-duplex mode.
Index Terms— Full-duplex, 5G, Physical-layer security, secrecy
degrees of freedom, interference cancellation receivers, joint
decoding.
I. INTRODUCTION
H ISTORICALLY, full-duplex communication, i.e. simul-taneous transmission and reception on the same radio
resource, had been considered impractical due to the over-
whelming loopback interference from the transmission-end at
the co-located receiver. Recent advances in self-interference
cancellation (SIC) allow suppressing this loopback inter-
ference to within tolerable limits, thereby making full-
duplex (FD) communication appealing with viable cost.
Ideally, FD communication has the potential to provide
a 100% throughput gain over conventional half-duplex (HD)
transmissions, making it a candidate technology component
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in the design of a novel fifth Generation (5G) radio access
technology [1]–[3].
Until recently, most studies on FD communication
have investigated its potential in according a throughput
gain [3]–[8], and/or improving the transmission latency [9],
[10]. It has been shown that the expected throughput gains
are conditioned on three strong assumptions [11], namely
i) perfect SIC, i i) available traffic at both ends to exploit the
arising transmission opportunities, and i i i) similar levels of
network interference with FD and HD transmissions. Simul-
taneous transmission from both ends leads to higher inter-cell
interference (ICI) for a network of FD nodes compared to
conventional HD nodes [3], [6]. Such increased ICI, along
with any residual self interference power, results in a reduction
of the possible throughput gains. Additionally considering a
practical downlink heavy traffic profile limits the instances
where the simultaneous transmission/reception capabilities of
FD communication can be utilized, resulting in a further
reduction of the throughput gains [10], [11].
Due to the somewhat limited throughput gain and latency
reduction, other potential applications of FD communication
have recently been investigated. The requirement of having
symmetric traffic in order to exploit FD opportunities have
lead to studying FD transmission for scenarios with symmetric
traffic profile, such as backhaul communication [12], [13].
Relays are also envisioned as a potential application area for
FD communication. The use of relays in multi-user FD com-
munication systems is considered as an effective approach to
improve spectral efficiency and expand its coverage [14], [15].
A relay-aided interference cancellation technique was pro-
posed for a FD relay wireless networks in [14]; whereas
the authors in [15] have proposed a two-timeslot two-way
FD relaying scheme for 5G wireless communication sys-
tems. In addition, some advances in throughput analysis and
optimization of wirelessly powered multi-antenna FD relay
systems were demonstrated in [16].
The broadcast nature of wireless transmission makes it vul-
nerable to be eavesdropped and raises potential security con-
cerns. Information-theoretic physical-layer security approach
focuses on the inherent capacity of the propagation channel to
provide security in the physical-layer itself [17, and references
therein]. Cooperative transmission via relays has been pro-
posed as an effective physical-layer security scheme [18]. The
performance of secure FD relaying has recently been analyzed
for single hop [19] and multi-hop [20] relays. However, ref-
erence [19] assumes non-negativity of the secrecy rate (which
is valid only when the direct channel is much stronger than
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the eavesdropper channel), whereas reference [20] assumes
perfect SIC; both being too optimistic as assumptions. Rather
than either HD or FD mode, a new hybrid FD/HD relay
selection technique to improve the physical-layer security has
been developed in [21]. The authors in [22] have investigated
the secrecy performance of FD relay networks demonstrating it
to have a better secrecy performance than HD relay networks
in scenarios where self-interference can be well suppressed.
They further proposed a FD jamming relay network wherein
the relay nodes transmit jamming signals simultaneously as it
receives the data from the source.
Physical-layer security with FD nodes for non-cooperative
communication has started gaining attention as well.
A transmit beamforming scheme for a full-duplex base station
(FD-BS) considering physical-layer security guarantee for
the system with multiple passive eavesdroppers is proposed
in [23]. On the other hand, [24] investigates the potential of
using FD jamming receivers to improve physical-layer secrecy
and robustness without the aid of external relays. However,
both of these contributions focus on developing a transmission
scheme to optimize the secrecy rate with simplistic assump-
tions limiting the applicability in realistic scenarios (e.g., strict
achievability of positive secrecy rate as in [19]).
The authors in [25] have designed a joint information and
jamming beamformer to ensure security at both the ends
for a FD-BS. Reference [26] considers a joint beamforming
and power optimization problem for multi-antenna full-duplex
transmission systems. The authors propose to utilize infor-
mation bearing signals to additionally act as artificial noise
against eavesdroppers, and show that the overall throughput
can be improved while simultaneously maintaining the desired
secrecy and quality of service levels. On the other hand, the
network requirements for a FD-BS are addressed to secure the
information being shared in a simultaneous information and
power transfer energy harvesting nodes in [27]. Furthermore,
an underlay cognitive radio system is considered in [28]
wherein the secondary transmitter sends information to a FD
receiver node in presence of an eavesdropper. The receiver
node is equipped with a power-splitter architecture, allowing
it to receive information as well as energy from the source.
This received energy is utilized to transmit jamming signals
to deteriorate eavesdropper’s decoding capacity. The work
in [29] assumes a FD wiretap channel in the presence of
an eavesdropper and imperfect channel state information, and
proposes techniques to maximize the achievable sum secrecy
rate.
A. Key Contributions
The secrecy potential of FD communication, expressed in
terms of the ergodic secrecy rate and the secrecy degrees
of freedom, is thoroughly analyzed in this contribution; and
compared against that of an equivalent HD links. This arti-
cle extends the state-of-the-art on the physical-layer secu-
rity potential of FD communication by specifically relaxing
the strictly positive secrecy rate constraint and considering
non-ideal SIC. Both, a single-user decoding Eve (SU-Eve)
with passive linear receivers, and a multi-user decoding Eve
(MU-Eve) with successive interference cancellation (IC) and
Fig. 1. System Model showing the considered FD transceiver pair in the
presence of Eve.
multiple access channel (MAC) joint decoding (JD) capabili-
ties, are both considered. In particular, the main contributions
of this paper in specific terms are1
• We present a closed form expression for the ergodic
secrecy rate of FD communication considering different
capabilities at Eve and non-ideal SIC,
• the strictly positive secrecy rate assumption is relaxed by
allowing unconstrained eavesdropper channel strength,
• the secrecy degrees of freedom of the considered scenar-
ios are characterized, and
• applications of the findings in emerging 5G networks are
discussed.
B. Paper Organization
Section II introduces the system model. Closed form expres-
sions for the ergodic secrecy rate upper bound, and the achiev-
able secrecy rate gap with respect to the upper bound when
considering Eve equipped with IC and MAC JD capabilities
are analyzed in Section III. The secrecy degrees of freedom
is then characterized in Section IV. Section V discusses
application of the derived findings in emerging 5G networks.
Finally, numerical results are presented in Section VI, followed
by closing remarks and future outlook in Section VII.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Information-theoretic security characterizes the fundamental
ability of the physical-layer to provide confidentiality. Let us
consider a single small cell with an active transceiver pair,
Alice and Bob, in the presence of Eve - an eavesdropper,
as shown in Figure 1. Alice intends to transmit an encoded
message W of coding block length n with rate R to Bob.
The rate R is said to be achievable with perfect secrecy
with respect to Eve if, as n → ∞ : (a) the probability of
decoding error at Bob vanishes, and (b) the uncertainty of
the message W as observed at Eve approaches the entropy
of the message itself [17], [32]. Following [17] and [33], we
consider the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian wiretap channel
defined as difference between the source-destination and the
source-eavesdropper rate to be the achievable secrecy rate.
An isolated cell is considered in order to focus the analysis
on FD communication. Each node in the transceiver pair can
1Partial results of this work are presented in [30] and [31].
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operate in either FD or HD mode. When operating in FD
mode, the appropriate SIC schemes are assumed to limit the
loopback self interference power to within tolerable limits. The
random variables  ∈ {X, Y, Z} in Figure 1 denote the random
signal-to-noise-ratios (SNR) of the respective channels among
Alice, Bob, and Eve. The realizations ϕ ∈ {x, y, z} of the
respective random variable (rv)  is represented as ϕ = ϕ¯ϕ˜,
with ϕ¯ ∈ {μ,φ,ψ} being the mean and ϕ˜ a unit mean rv
similarly distributed as ϕ.
A. Signal Model
1) Desired Signal Power: With FD communication, the
desired signal to interference plus noise ratio (SINR) at Bob
(and Alice) is denoted as
γF D = XI + 1 , (1)
where I denotes the noise-normalized residual self interference
power after SIC at the receiver end. In the case of HD nodes
I = 0, and the SINR is simply given by the SNR, i.e.,
γH D = X.
Generally, the desired Alice-Bob link is part of the same
system and hence system designers have more information
about, and control over, this link. The Nakagami-m fading
distribution, which is a general fading distribution that includes
a wide range of other distributions as special cases via its shape
parameter m [34], is therefore adopted to model the desired
signal amplitude. The SNR X is correspondingly distributed
according to the following gamma distribution [34]
fX (x; m, μ) = m
m xm−1
μm(m)
exp
(
−mx
μ
)
, (2)
where the gamma distribution is characterized by the parame-
ter m and the mean SNR μ, and (m) 
∫ ∞
0 t
m−1 exp(−t) dt
is the Gamma function.
The cumulative distribution function (CDF) of X, defined
as FX (x) =
∫ x
0 fX (t) dt is given by
FX (x; m, μ) =
γ
(
m, mxμ
)
(m)
, (3)
where γ (m, x) 
∫ x
0 t
m−1 exp(−t) dt is the lower incomplete
Gamma function [35, 6.5.2].
2) Signal Power at the Eavesdropper Node: Without loss
of generality, we assume Alice to be the transmitting node in
HD scenario. The eavesdropped message at Eve is received
with the SNR βH D = Y. In contrast, Alice and Bob transmit
simultaneously in FD mode, resulting in an additional source
of interference at Eve. The resulting SINR of the eavesdropped
message at Eve from Alice and Bob are respectively given by
βa = YZ + 1 , and βb =
Z
Y + 1 . (4)
Since the eavesdropper is usually an external node to the
Alice-Bob system with more uncertainty about its location,
the signal amplitude at Eve is assumed to follow the widely
adopted Rayleigh fading distribution. The SNR Y (and Z ) with
mean φ(ψ) are correspondingly distributed according to the
following exponential distributions [34]
fY (y)= 1
φ
exp
(
− y
φ
)
, and fZ (z)= 1
ψ
exp
(
− z
ψ
)
. (5)
a) The distribution of β: To derive the distribution of
β,2 we introduce the variable u = yz+1 , and marginalize
over the rv z in order to obtain fβ(u|z) = fY (y(u)) dydu . The
desired distribution of β is thereafter obtained as fβ(u) =
Ez[ fβ(u|z)] = exp
(
− uφ
)
/φEz
[
(z + 1) exp
(
− uzφ
)]
, where
E[·] is the expectation operator. Following some algebraic
manipulations, the probability density function (PDF) is
derived as
fβ(u) = exp (−u/φ)
uψ + φ
[
φψ
uψ + φ + 1
]
. (6)
On a similar note, the CDF of β defined as Fβ(u) =∫ u
0 fβ(t) dt evaluates to
Fβ(u) = 1 − exp (−u/φ)
1 + u ψφ
. (7)
For the special case when Eve is equidistant from Alice and
Bob (i.e. φ = ψ), the PDF and the CDF can respectively be
further simplified as
fβ(u) = exp (−u/φ)1 + u
[
1
1 + u +
1
φ
]
,
Fβ(u) = 1 − exp (−u/φ)1 + u . (8)
B. Achievable Secrecy Rate
1) Secrecy Rate With HD: Let us define the function C (x) =
log2(1 + x). Assuming the maximal additive white Gaussian
noise (AWGN) rate can be achieved at every resource slot, the
desired achievable rate between Alice and Bob is Rx = C (x),
while the unwanted eavesdropped rate at Eve is Ry = C (y).
Following the definition of secrecy rate as the strictly positive
difference between the desired rate and the eavesdropped rate,
the instantaneous secrecy rate in HD mode is given by
SH D = max
{
Rx − Ry, 0
}
=
{
C (x) − C (y) when x > y
0 otherwise.
(9)
2) Secrecy Rate With FD: Alice and Bob can communicate
simultaneously with each other when both are equipped with
FD nodes, with both transmissions subject to potential over-
hearing by Eve. The achievable rate between Alice and Bob
can be expressed as Rab = C (γF D) , where γF D is the SINR
in FD mode as given by Eq. (1). Similarly, the achievable
rate at Eve considering the transmission from Alice to Bob
is Rae = C (βa) with βa given by Eq. (4). The instantaneous
secrecy rate of the Alice to Bob link with FD transmissions
is then given by
SF D,a =
{
C (γF D) − C (βa) when γF D > βa
0 otherwise. (10)
2The index ∈ {a, b} is henceforth dropped as the usage is clear from the
context.
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On a similar note, the instantaneous secrecy rate of the
reverse Bob to Alice link with FD transmissions is SF D,b =
max {Rab − Rbe, 0} , where Rbe = C (βb) . Finally, the instan-
taneous secrecy rate of the considered system with FD com-
munication can be expressed as SF D = SF D,a + SF D,b.
C. Secrecy Degrees of Freedom
The degrees of freedom of a wireless link is an indication of
the capacity pre-log factor in the capacity computation, and is
an important information-theoretic measure [17], [36]. Being
a difference of two achievable rates, the achievable secrecy
rate easily lends itself to degrees of freedom analysis. More
specifically, the secrecy degrees of freedom (sdof) region is
a characterization of the high SNR behaviour of the secrecy
capacity. Following [17] and [37], we define the sdof with the
ratios ηφ  μφ and ηψ 
μ
ψ fixed as
dϑ = lim
μ→∞ sup
Sϑ
log μ
, (11)
where ϑ ∈ {H D, F D} is the transmission mode.
III. ACHIEVABLE SECRECY RATE ANALYSIS
The first part of this section considers a SU-Eve equipped
with a linear receiver, which represents an upper bound on
the achievable secrecy rate with FD communication. A more
advanced receiver at Eve capable of multi-user decoding is
assumed in the following subsection.
A. Achievable Secrecy Rate Analysis With Single-User
Decoding Eve: Upper Bound
1) Achievable Secrecy Rate Analysis for HD Communica-
tion: The achievable ergodic secrecy rate can be obtained by
averaging the instantaneous secrecy rate given in Eq. (9) over
the distributions of the rvs x and y, and is expressed as
S¯H D = E [SH D] = E [C (x) − C (y)] Pr[x > y]
= log(e)
∫ ∞
0
ln(1 + x) fX (x)Pr[y < x] dx
− log(e)
∫ ∞
0
ln(1 + y) fY (y)Pr[x > y] dy, (12)
where Pr[·] denotes probability, and FY (y)  1 − exp(−y/φ)
is the CDF of Y.
The Meijer’s G Function: Direct evaluation of the integrals
in Eq. (12) is not straightforward. Instead, we propose to
utilize the Meijer’s G function, which is a highly general
class of integral function that can represent a wide variety of
functions and lends itself to succinct integral manipulations.
The Meijer’s G function, designated by the symbol Gm,np,q [x],
is defined in [38, eq. (5)]. The Meijer’s G function is widely
adopted in the literature owing to its ease of application and
readily available software implementation in standard mathe-
matical software like Mathematica, Maple and Matlab [39].
The logarithm and the exponential function is repre-
sented in terms of the Meijer’s G function as ln (1 + x) =
G1,22,2
[
x
∣∣∣ 1,11,0
]
and e−x = G1,00,1
[
x
∣∣−
0
] [38, Eq. (11)]. Using
the above representations and [40, eq. (07.34.21.0002.01)],
the lower incomplete Gamma function γ (m, x) in Eq. (3)
can also be represented in terms of the Meijer’s G function
as γ (m, x) = ∫ x0 tm−1G1,00,1[t ∣∣−0 ] dt = G1,11,2
[
x
∣∣∣ 1m,0
]
. An
integration involving the product of two Meijer’s G functions
is also a Meijer’s G function [38, eq. (21)]. The solution
to integrations involving the product of three Meijer’s G
functions is a Meijer’s G function of two variables expressed in
terms of the extended generalized bivariate Meijer’s G function
(EGBMGF) [41, eq. (8)], [40, eq. (07.34.21.0081.01)], as
presented by Eq. (13) at the bottom of this page.
Applications of the EGBMGF have been demonstrated
in [42] and [43], while its efficient implementations is readily
available in Mathematica [42, Table II] and Matlab [44].
Lemma 1: The achievable ergodic secrecy rate for half-
duplex communication is presented in terms of the Meijer’s G
function and the EGBMGF as
S¯H D = log(e)
(m)
{
G1,0:1,2:1,11,0:2,2:1,2
[
1
−
∣∣∣∣1, 11, 0
∣∣∣∣ 1m, 0
∣∣∣∣φ, mφμ
]
+ G1,33,2
[
μ
m
∣∣∣∣1, 1, 1 − m1, 0
]
− (m)G1,33,2
[
φ
∣∣∣∣1, 1, 01, 0
]
−
(
1 + μ
mφ
)−m
G1,33,2
[
μφ
mφ + μ
∣∣∣∣1, 1, 1 − m1, 0
]}
.
(14)
Proof: See Appendix A. 
2) Achievable Secrecy Rate Analysis for FD Communica-
tion: With FD communication, the total instantaneous secrecy
rate of our single user system is the sum of the instantaneous
secrecy rates of both the communication directions, i.e.
SF D = max {log(1 + γF D) − log(1 + βa), 0}︸ ︷︷ ︸
SF D,a
+ max {log(1 + γF D) − log(1 + βb), 0}︸ ︷︷ ︸
SF D,b
. (15)
The average of SF D,a, the achievable secrecy rate for the
Alice to Bob link, can be expanded as
S¯F D,a =
∫ ∞
0
C (x) fγF D (x)Fβa (x) dx
−
∫ ∞
0
C (u) fβa (u)
(
1 − FγF D (u)
)
du, (16)
∫ ∞
0
tα−1Gm,0p,q
[
ct
∣∣∣∣a1, . . . , apb1, . . . , bq
]
Gm1,n1p1,q1
[
c1t
∣∣∣∣a11, . . . , a1p1b11, . . . , b1q1
]
Gm2,n2p2,q2
[
c2t
∣∣∣∣a21, . . . , a2p2b21, . . . , b2q2
]
dt
= c−α Gm,0:m1,n1:m2,n2q,p:p1,q1:p2,q2
[
α + b1, . . . , α + bq
α + a1, . . . , α + ap
∣∣∣∣a11, . . . , a1p1b11, . . . , b1q1
∣∣∣∣ a21, . . . , a2p2b21, . . . , b2q2
∣∣∣∣ c1c ,
c2
c
]
. (13)
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where the PDF and CDF of γF D follows from Eqs. (2) and (3)
with μ replaced by the constant mμ˜ with μ˜ defined as μ˜ =
μ
(I+1)m . The PDF and CDF of βa is derived in Section II-A.
Lemma 2: The average achievable secrecy rate for the
Alice to Bob link with full-duplex communication and in the
presence of a SU-Eve is presented in terms of the Meijer’s
G function and the EGBMGF as presented by Eq. (17) at the
bottom of this page.
Proof: See Appendix B. 
a) Final expression for S¯F D,a: Finally, the achievable
ergodic secrecy rate for full-duplex communication in the
presence of a SU-Eve is
S¯F D = ¯SF D,a + ¯SF D,b, (18)
where S¯F D,b is similarly derived as in Lemma 2 with ψ and
φ replaced by each other.
3) Special Cases: In the special case when φ = ψ,
the ergodic secrecy rate with FD communication for both
directions are the same, resulting in S¯F D = 2S¯F D,a = 2S¯F D,b.
Moreover, if the Alice to Bob link is assumed to be Rayleigh
distributed (i.e., m = 1) with Eve equidistant from Alice
and Bob, the ergodic secrecy rates for the HD and FD case
respectively reduces to
S¯H D =
G1,33,2
[
μ
∣∣∣1,1,01,0
]
− G1,33,2
[
μφ
μ+φ
∣∣∣ 1,1,01,0
]
ln(2)
, and
S¯F D =
2G1,33,2
[
μ˜
∣∣∣ 1,1,01,0
]
ln(2)
−
2κG1,0:1,2:1,11,0:2,2:1,1
[
1
−
∣∣∣ 1,11,0
∣∣∣ 00
∣∣∣ κ, κ]
ln(2)μ˜
−
2κ
∑2
α=1 φα−2G
1,0:1,2:1,1
1,0:2,2:1,1
[
1
−
∣∣∣ 1,11,0
∣∣∣ 1−α0
∣∣∣ κ, κ]
ln(2)
,
where κ = μ˜φ
μ˜+φ .
B. Achievable Secrecy Rate Analysis With
Multi-User Decoding Eve
The channels from both Alice and Bob to Eve forms
a multiple-access channel. In this section, Eve is assumed
to be equipped with successive interference cancellation
capability. In addition, we apply MAC joint decoding
for the eavesdropped rate at Eve for the instances when
the Alice/Bob to Eve channel is not strong enough to
allow IC.
Alice and Bob are assumed to transmit to each other with
fixed rates Ra and Rb respectively. IC capabilities at Eve
implies it is able to decode the message from Alice/Bob if
received at a rate greater than the transmission rate. Focusing
on the Alice to Bob transmission link in FD mode, let us
define the eavesdropped rate RE A at Eve pertaining to the
MAC performance with IC and JD. The eavesdropped rate
measures the supremum of the achievable rate from Alice to
Eve for the transmission of rate Rb by Bob. Notice that the
rate Rb is not necessarily decodable by Eve. Given y, z, βa
and βb, the eavesdropped rate is given by [32]
RE A =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
C (y) if Rb ≤ C (βb)
C (y + z) − Rb if C (βb) < Rb ≤ C (z)
C (βa) if Rb > C (z),
(19)
where the first two cases respectively represent the eaves-
dropped rate following IC and JD at Eve. The secrecy rate
pertaining to MAC performance is given by SM AC,a =
max (Ra − RE A, 0) . The achievable rate RE B and the corre-
sponding achievable secrecy rate for the Bob to Eve link can
similarly be defined by interchanging the variables Ra with
Rb, y with z, and βa with βb.
An analysis of the loss in achievable secrecy rate with
MU-Eve compared to that with SU-Eve is presented in the
following discussion. IC is investigated first, followed by MAC
JD considerations at Eve. The analysis considers the Alice-Bob
and Alice-Eve links. Henceforth, we assume Ra = Rb = R
and introduce the constant R′ = 2R − 1. The Alice to Bob
link is assumed to support the rate R, i.e., R ≤ C (γ ) for all
channel realizations.
Successive Interference Cancellation Analysis
1) Probability of Successful IC: Let us first investigate the
probabilities of successful IC at Eve. We assume perfect IC
whenever possible. Eve is able to apply IC for the Bob-Eve
interference channel given the rate C (βb) ≥ R ⇒ z ≥
R′(y + 1) as pictorially depicted in Figure 2a. The probability
of successful IC is given by Pr[IC] = Pr[z ≥ R′(y + 1)],
which readily evaluates to
Pr[IC] =
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
R′(y+1)
f (z) f (y) dz dy = exp(−R
′/ψ)
φλ
,
(20)
where λ  R
′φ+ψ
φψ . It can be straightforwardly shown that the
probability of successful IC approaches zero in the high SNR
regime. The formal proof is omitted due to lack of space.
Instead, an outline is presented below.
In the high SNR regime, φ and ψ 
 1. Additionally,
R′ 
 1 provided R is selected to match the channel condi-
tions. Under normal operating conditions where φ and ψ are of
similar order of magnitude, we thus have φλ = 1+ R′φψ 
 1.
On the other hand, the numerator in Pr[IC] is upper bounded
S¯F D,a = log(e)
(m)
{
G1,33,2
[
μ˜
∣∣∣∣1, 1, 1 − m1, 0
]
−
(
1 + μ˜
φ
)−m
G1,0:1,2:1,11,0:2,2:1,1
[
m
−
∣∣∣∣1, 11, 0
∣∣∣∣ 00
∣∣∣∣ μ˜φμ˜ + φ ,
μ˜ψ
μ˜ + φ
]
− (m)
2∑
α=1
μ˜ψα−1
(μ˜ + φ)
m−1∑
n=0
(
1 + μ˜φ
)−n
n! G
1,0:1,2:1,1
1,0:2,2:1,1
[
n + 1
−
∣∣∣∣1, 11, 0
∣∣∣∣ 1 − α0
∣∣∣∣ μ˜φμ˜ + φ ,
μ˜ψ
μ˜ + φ
]⎫⎪⎬
⎪⎭ . (17)
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by unity, i.e., exp(−R′/ψ) ≤ 1. Therefore, we readily observe
that Pr[IC] → 0 under such conditions.
An exception can be observed when R′ is low while ψ 
 φ
(Eve much closer to Bob than Alice), in which case Pr[IC]
will be non-negligible. However, the achievable secrecy rate
defined as (R − C (y))+ in that case will mostly be zero owing
to the fact that y 
 1 following the high SNR regime
assumption; and hence the impact of such successful IC on
the secrecy rate is nonetheless limited.
2) Achievable Secrecy Rate Gap: Unlike the high SNR
regime, the probability of successful IC is non-negligible in
the SNR regime of practical interest, namely in the range of
0 ∼ 30 dB. Let us analyse the loss in the achievable secrecy
rate, i.e., SI C = SF D,a − sM AC,a with IC at Eve under such
circumstances. For this analysis, we further assume R′ ≥ 1,
which is mostly true in the operating regime of interest. R′ < 1
is not an interesting scenario as it leads to low secrecy rates
in any case.
Assuming R′ ≥ 1, the conditions for successful IC implies
non zero secrecy rate with SU-Eve, i.e. z ≥ R′(y + 1) ⇒
y ≤ R′(z + 1). When y ≤ R′, MU-Eve and SU-Eve both
result in non zero secrecy rates, with the secrecy rate gap
expressed as SI C = C (y)−C
(
y
1+z
)
. On the other hand, y >
R′ means zero secrecy rate with MU-Eve. Correspondingly
SI C = R − C
(
y
1+z
)
, as shown in Figure 2a. The average
secrecy rate can thus be expressed as
¯SI C = R
∫ ∞
R′
∫ ∞
R′(y+1)
f (z) f (y) dz dy
︸ ︷︷ ︸
L1
+
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
R′(y+1)
(C (z) − C (y + z)) f (z) f (y) dz dy
︸ ︷︷ ︸
L2−L4
+
∫ R′
0
∫ ∞
R′(y+1)
C (y) f (z) f (y) dz dy
︸ ︷︷ ︸
L3
. (21)
The integrals L2, L3 and L4 in Eq. (21) can either be
solved using the techniques outlined in Appendix VII or using
suitable numerical integration techniques as outlined in [35,
Ch. 25]. In order to reveal better insights, we instead propose
to estimate each of these three integrals with their upper
bound obtained by applying Jensen’s inequality. Following
some algebraic manipulation, the secrecy rate gap resulting
from IC at Eve can subsequently be estimated as
¯SI C ≈ L1 + C
(
zˆ
)
︸︷︷︸
≥L2
+ C (y¨)︸︷︷︸
≥L3
− C (yˆ + zˆ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥L4
, (22)
where
L1 = R exp
(−R′λ + R′/ψ)
φλ
,
yˆ 
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
R′(y+1)
y f (z) f (y) dz dy = exp
(−R′/ψ)
φλ2
,
y¨ 
∫ R′
0
∫ ∞
R′(y+1)
y f (z) f (y) dz dy
Fig. 2. Pictorial depiction of the conditions leading to a positive (+ve) secrecy
rate and successful IC and MAC JD at Eve.
= exp
(−R′/ψ)
φλ2
[
1 − (1 + λR′) exp(−λR′)] ,
zˆ 
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
R′(y+1)
z f (z) f (y) dz dy
= exp
(−R′/ψ)
φλ2
[
R′(1 + λ) + λψ] .
Joint Decoding Analysis
3) Probability of Successful JD: The successful JD region
is characterized by the region R′ ≤ z < R′(y + 1) for all y
as depicted in Figure 2b. Hence, the probability of successful
JD is given by
Pr[JD] =
∫ ∞
0
∫ R′(y+1)
R′
f (z) f (y) dz dy = R
′ exp(−R′/ψ)
ψλ
.
(23)
Unlike the probability of successful IC, the probability of
successful JD is not negligible under most SNR conditions.
4) Achievable Secrecy Rate Gap With JD: The gap in the
achievable secrecy rate with MAC joint decoding is briefly
discussed in this section. Figure 2b depicts the regions under
which JD is possible and translates to a positive secrecy rate.
4398 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON COMMUNICATIONS, VOL. 65, NO. 10, OCTOBER 2017
Fig. 3. Numerical validation of the IC/JD success probabilities and the
secrecy rate gap estimations with an IC and MAC JD capable MU-Eve.
Two different regions are of interest. Firstly, the triangular
region characterized by R′ ≤ z < R′(y + 1) and y + z ≤
R′′  22R − 1 represents the scenario where JD is possible
and results in a non-negative secrecy rate. The secrecy rate
gap in this case is R − C (βa) − (2R − C (y + z)) = C (z) − R.
The rest of the area where JD is possible pertains to zero
secrecy rate following JD, in which case the secrecy rate gap
is simply R − C (βa). The ergodic secrecy rate loss resulting
from MAC JD at Eve can be estimated following similar steps
as in Section III-B. The straightforward derivation is omitted
herein in the interest of brevity and space.
Preliminary Numerical Validation
Numerical validation of the IC/JD success probabilities and
the secrecy rate gap estimations are briefly discussed in this
section. The success probability with IC and MAC JD for
R = 2 and R = 10 bps/Hz are shown in Figure 3a followed by
the corresponding average secrecy rate gap in Figure 3b. Only
the Alice to Bob link is considered. Two different channel
conditions are addressed, a moderate SNR scenario of φ =
ψ = 20 dB and a high SNR scenario where φ = 30 dB and
ψ = 40 dB.
The probability of successful IC at Eve is found to be
negligible for R = 10 (high R) as discussed earlier in this
section. Moreover, Figure 3b reveals that the higher successful
IC probability at low R translates to an negligible secrecy rate
gap as indicated in the foregoing discussion. The rate loss
with JD at Eve is non-negligible at higher values of R. The
behaviour of this rate gap in the asymptotically high SNR
regime is discussed in Section IV-C.
IV. SECRECY DEGREES OF FREEDOM ANALYSIS
The exact secrecy capacity region is difficult to obtain
under most interference conditions. The secrecy degrees of
freedom, which measures the pre-log factor of the achievable
secrecy rate at high SNR cases, is usually investigated instead.
Though a considerably coarse measure, the sdof analysis
is tractable and provides valuable insights into the secrecy
capacity behaviour in the asymptotic high SNR regime.
A. Secrecy Degrees of Freedom Analysis of Half-Duplex
Communication
In HD mode, the instantaneous achievable secrecy rate is
given by SH D = max{C (x)−C (y), 0}. In the asymptotic SNR
regime C (x) − C (y) → log( xy ) as {μ,φ} → ∞ with fixed
ηφ = μφ , which in turn implies lim{μ,φ}→∞ SH D =
lim{μ,φ}→∞ (C (x) − C (y)) Pr[x > y] < log
(
x
y
)
.
Observing the rv xy , we can deduce that Pr[ xy < θ ] =
Pr
[
y > xθ
] = EX
[
exp
(
− xθφ
)]
, where the last step follows
from the complimentary CDF of the exponential rv Y. The
preceeding expectation is by definition the Laplace Transform
(LT) of the gamma distributed rv X, and is given by MX (s) =
EX [exp (−sx)] =
(
1 + μs
m
)−m [34]. Substituting the above
result, we obtain Pr[ xy < θ ] =
(
1 + ηφ
mθ
)−m
. Using this
formulation, it can be deduced that, in the asymptotic SNR
regime, Pr[ xy < ∞] = 1 as long as the ratio ηφ is bounded.
We therefore have
lim{μ,φ}→∞ SH D < ∞, (24)
i.e., the instantaneous secrecy rate with HD communication
is asymptotically bounded for a bounded ηφ. Consequently,
with a bounded instantaneous secrecy rate, the sdof of HD
communication is by definition zero, i.e.
dH D = lim
μ→∞ sup
SH D
log μ
= 0. (25)
B. Secrecy Degrees of Freedom Analysis of Full-Duplex
Communication With SU-Eve
The instantaneous achievable secrecy rate in FD mode is
given in terms of the SINRs γF D, βa and βb since SF D =
max{C (γ f d) − C (βa) , 0} + max{C (γ f d) − C (βb) , 0}. To
derive the sdof, let us look into the involved SINR figures,
namely γF D, βa and βb, in the asymptotic regime. We can
observe from Eq. (7) that, by letting {φ,ψ} → ∞, with the
ratios ηφ and ηψ = μψ fixed (which also implies bound φψ ), the
SINRs βa and βb remain bounded. In other words, for fixed
φ
ψ , Pr[βa < ∞] = Pr[βb < ∞] = 1.
On the other hand, we can rewrite the SINR of the Alice to
Bob channel as γF D = xI+1 = μx˜I+1 , where x˜ is a unit mean
gamma distributed rv. This allows us to present the achievable
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secrecy rate SF D,a of the Alice to Bob link in the asymptotic
SNR regime as
lim{μ,φ,ψ}→∞ SF D,a
= max
{
log(μ)−log
(
(1+βa)(I +1)
x˜
)
, 0
}
= log(μ)−ξa,
(26)
where ξa < ∞ is a constant. Similarly, it can be shown that
the achievable secrecy rate SF D,b of the reverse Bob to Alice
link in the asymptotic SNR regime is lim{μ,φ,ψ}→∞ SF D,b =
log(μ) − ξb, with ξb < ∞ being a constant. Consolidating
the above discussion, the sdof with FD communication with
SU-Eve is expressed as dF D = limμ→∞ sup SF D,a + SF D,blog(μ) ;
which can be subsequently derived as
dF D = lim
μ→∞
2 log(μ) − ξa − ξb
log(μ)
= 2. (27)
Hence, we can observe that the dof of FD communication is
fully maintained even in the physical-layer security aspect, i.e
the dof [45] and sdof in FD mode are the same. This is in
contrast with conventional HD communication, where the dof
is fully lost when the secrecy rate is considered [17].
C. Secrecy Degrees of Freedom Analysis of Full-Duplex
Communication With MU-Eve
We have observed in Section III-B that the secrecy rate
loss is negligible with interference cancellation capabilities at
Eve. Hence the sdof with IC capable Eve remains unchanged.
On the other hand, the rate gap with MAC joint decoding
capable Eve is non-negligible. In this section, we show that
this non-negligible rate gap is independent of the SNR, and
hence vanishes when normalized by the log(SN R) in the
asymptotically high SNR limit. Let us assume that Alice to
Bob rate R is selected to support the instantaneous SNR γ,
i.e., R = C (γ ).
1) Probability of Positive Secrecy Rate With JD at Eve:
Joint Decoding at Eve results in a positive secrecy rate when
C (y + z) ≤ 2R ⇒ y + z ≤ R′′. At high SNR R → log(γ ),
and hence R′′ = 22R − 1 → γ 2. Thus we have, Pr[y + z ≤
R′′] → Pr
[
y˜
ηφ
+ z˜ηψ ≤ μ
(
x˜
I+1
)2]
. In the asymptotic limit as
μ → ∞, this probability is one almost surely since ηφ, ηψ
and x˜I+1 are bounded as μ → ∞.
2) Asymptotic Rate Gap With JD at Eve: Since, Pr[y + z ≤
R′′] → 1 and R = C (γ ), the rate gap with JD at Eve as
derived in Section III-B.2 is given by SJ D = C (z) − C (γ ).
In the asymptotically high SNR limit, SJ D → log(z/γ ).
As a result, we have
lim
μ→∞
SJ D
log(μ)
→ lim
μ→∞
log
(
z˜(I+1)
x˜ηψ
)
log(μ)
→ 0.
It is thus readily observable that the rate gap with JD at Eve
does not impact the sdof since it vanishes when normalized
by SNR in the asymptotic SNR limit.
Hence, the secrecy degrees of freedom of full-duplex
communication are unaffected in the presence of MU-Eve
with interference cancellation and MAC joint decoding
capabilities.
V. APPLICATIONS OF THE SECRECY RESULT FINDINGS
Applications of the derived findings in emerging 5G systems
is discussed in this section.
A. Applications in Device to Device Communication
Alongside the conventional cellular connection between the
base station and the user equipment, 5G systems may well
support an additional device-tier architecture for direct com-
munication among the devices. In fact, direct device-to-device
(D2D) communication is envisioned as a key technology
solution towards accommodating the demanding KPI targets
of 5G [46]. FD communication has been proposed for such
D2D communications, especially considering the close range
of the devices and the symmetric nature of the traffic profile in
both transmission directions [47]. FD capability is also found
to allow faster device discovery for D2D nodes [48].
Security is an important technical challenges in D2D
communication. Cellular networks have a certain degree of
inherent security features such as authentication, integrity and
access control. Due to its very nature, D2D communication
cannot guarantee the same level of security as do cellular
networks. The communicating parties must be assured that
their data is not accessible to any unwanted nodes in the
vicinity. The findings presented in this work demonstrate that a
very high degree of physical-layer security can be achieved by
enabling FD communication between the D2D nodes. Hence,
alongside the desirable gains in terms of throughput, latency,
and device discovery time, FD can also enhance physical layer
security in D2D communication.
B. Applications in Cellular Networks With BS FD
Despite the potential benefits of FD communication, it may
not be readily available for commercial deployment at the
UE level in the recent future due to size, power, and cost
constraints. An intermediate proposal is to enable the base
stations with FD capabilities, and is known as the base station
full-duplex (BS-FD) architecture [1].
The investigations in this contribution have revealed that the
simultaneous transmission from both end of a FD communica-
tion link is the main contributor to the enhanced physical-layer
security. Such a finding can be utilized to accord protection to
an UE scheduled in the uplink direction with strong physical-
layer security requirement in a BS-FD network.
In the downlink direction, the FD capable BS can schedule
an UE in close vicinity of the uplink UE, as depicted in
Figure 4. The eavesdropped signal at any eavesdropper in
the vicinity of the scheduled uplink UE will be masked by
the simultaneous downlink transmission to another nearby
UE, thereby resulting in the strong secrecy rate demonstrated
in this paper. Such interference-assisted secret communica-
tion has earlier proposed for the conventional HD network
(e.g. [49, and references therein]). However, the downlink
scheduled UE would also be affected by the uplink trans-
mission. The transmission in the downlink direction must
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Fig. 4. Enhancing Physical-layer security though scheduling to induce a
FD-like scenario at the eavesdropper node.
therefore be either artificial noise, or transmitted with a
sufficiently low data rate. Thus, enhanced security for the
BS-FD network setup is achieved at the expense of sacrificing
the downlink data rate of the secondary link.
C. Applications in Conventional HD Cellular Networks
The concept of scheduling users to enhance the secrecy rate
can be further extended to conventional HD networks as shown
in Figure 4. An UE scheduled in the uplink direction with
strong physical-layer security requirement can be concurrently
scheduled with a nearby UE, also in the uplink direction.
Let us term the two UEs as the protected and the protecting
UE respectively. If the BS is equipped with interference
cancellation or interference suppression type receivers, the
traffic of both the UEs can be simultaneously decoded with
a well designed radio resource management technique and/or
with the aid of IC and JD at the base station. Alternatively,
the protecting UE can be scheduled with traffic that is already
known at the BS, which would make the resulting interference
easily treatable.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
The ergodic secrecy rate, the sdof and the throughput
analysis of FD and HD communication are numerically val-
idated through Matlab® based Monte Carlo simulations in
this Section. At least 100, 000 independent snapshots of each
scenario are simulated to ensure statistical reliability. Unless
stated otherwise, the following general simulation parameters
are assumed to reflect a typical propagation scenario: gamma
parameter for the desired signal channel m = 2, the noise-
normalized residual self interference I = 1 and Eve equidis-
tant from Alice and Bob, i.e. φ = ψ.
A. Ergodic Secrecy Rate as a Function of μ and φ
The ergodic secrecy rate of FD and HD communication for
different ratios of the desired and eavesdropper channel SNR
(i.e. μφ ) with respect to (w.r.t.) the mean SNR μ are presented
in Figure 5. Weak, medium, and strong eavesdropper channels
are considered, corresponding to μφ = [10, 0, and −10] dB.
First of all, FD is found to considerably enhance the physical-
layer secrecy rate over conventional HD communication. This
is due to the simultaneous transmission from both the trans-
mitter and the receiver, which generates an additional source
Fig. 5. The ergodic secrecy rate of FD and HD communication for different
values of μ and φ.
of interference at the eavesdropper. The resulting interference
acts as a natural deterrent to eavesdropping attempt at Eve,
thereby enhancing the physical-layer security potential of
FD communication.
Secondly, it is interesting to note that the ergodic secrecy
rate in FD mode is almost independent of the strength towards
the eavesdropper channel, especially at high SNR values.
In contrast, the ergodic secrecy rate with HD is strongly
dependent on the eavesdropper channel strength relative to the
desired channel, and is found to approach zero for large values
of μφ .
Finally, the slope of the ergodic secrecy rate curves are also
distinctly different for FD and HD communication. In conven-
tional HD mode, the ergodic secrecy rate is found to flatten
out and converge to a constant as μ → ∞. On the other hand,
the ergodic secrecy rate with FD communication is observed to
grow linearly with a fixed slope w.r.t. μ (in dB). This confirms
the analysis presented in Section IV that the sdof is 2 with FD
whereas it is 0 with HD communication.
B. Ergodic Secrecy Rate as a Function
of Fading Parameter m
The impact of the Gamma fading parameter m on the
ergodic secrecy rate is investigated in this subsection. The
ergodic secrecy rate for m = 1 and m = 2.5 with different
mean SNR values w.r.t ηφ = μφ is presented in Figure 6.
Gamma parameter m = 1 corresponds to a Rayleigh faded
channel, while m = 2.5 reflects a channel with relatively lower
amount of fading.
Similar to the findings observed in Figure 5, the ergodic
secrecy rate with FD is found to be almost constant w.r.t. ηφ.
Moreover, there is a huge gain of a factor of around 10 in the
ergodic secrecy rate as μ is increased from 10 dB to 30 dB.
Finally, the amount of fading is found to have only a slight
impact on the ergodic secrecy rate, with the ergodic secrecy
rate increasing with increasing m (i.e., as the fading gets less
severe). It is worthwhile to note that the derived analytical
results match perfectly with the simulation results in most
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Fig. 6. The ergodic secrecy rate of FD and HD communication w.r.t. ηφ  μφ
for different mean SNR (μ) and m values.
cases. However, since the lower incomplete gamma function
was approximated by its nearest integer m for non-integer m in
deriving the ergodic secrecy rate in FD mode, we can observe
a slight gap for m = 2.5 at low ηφ values.
The observations for the conventional HD mode once again
reveal the potential of enhancing the physical-layer security
with FD communication. Firstly, the ergodic secrecy rate in
HD mode is found to be strongly dependent on eavesdropper
channel. Furthermore, the impact of the desired Alice to Bob
channel SNR is less pronounced in this case with only a slight
gain in the ergodic secrecy rate as μ is increased from 10 dB
to 30 dB.
C. Ergodic Secrecy Rate as a Function of the
Residual Self Interference Power I
The noise normalized residual self interference power I
is an important parameter for FD communication. In this
subsection, we explore its impact on the ergodic secrecy rate.
The ergodic secrecy rate corresponding to perfect SIC (I = 0),
SIC to the level of noise floor (I = 1) and I = 10 are
presented w.r.t. μ in Figure 7. Furthermore, asymmetricity
in the eavesdropper channel is also considered by choosing
ψ/φ = [2, 5], while ηφ is set at 10 dB.
First of all, asymmetricity in the eavesdropper channel, i.e.,
having φ = ψ, has little impact on the ergodic secrecy rate,
especially at higher values of μ. In contrast, the residual self
interference power plays an important role. In fact, for lower
values of μ, the ergodic secrecy rate in FD mode is lower than
that of HD mode with I set to 10 dB. This reiterates the well
know maxim for FD communication that significant gains with
FD communication requires a strong direct link (i.e., large μ)
and sufficient isolation of the self interference power. Though
not shown in Figure 7, the plots for different I values are
found to converge to the same secrecy rate as μ → ∞, which
conforms to the finding presented in Section IV that the sdof
in FD mode is independent of the residual self interference
power I.
Fig. 7. The ergodic secrecy rate of FD and HD communication w.r.t. μ for
different values of the self interference power I.
Fig. 8. The ergodic secrecy rate of FD communication with SU-Eve and
MU-Eve, I = 5 dB.
D. Ergodic Secrecy Rate With Advanced Receiver at Eve
The ergodic secrecy rate considering a MU-Eve with suc-
cessive interference cancellation and MAC joint decoding
capabilities for different configurations are shown in Figure 8.
Two cases are considered, namely φ = ψ = 2μ, and φ =
2μ,ψ = 10μ. Both represent scenarios where Eve is closer
to Alice/Bob than themselves - with conditions conducive for
IC/JD. As discussed in Section III-B, the loss in the secrecy
rate with only IC at Eve is minimal. On the other hand, that
with MAC JD at Eve is not negligible, though the gap does
not grow with the SNR. This is also manifested in the sdof
analysis presented in Section IV-C.
E. Secrecy Degrees of Freedom Results
Being an asymptotic SNR characterization of the secrecy
rate, the sdof is not readily amenable to numerical simulations.
However, to demonstrate the validity of the analysis presented
in Section IV, the behaviour of max Slog(μ) is presented in
Figure 9 as a function of the mean SNR μ in logarithmic
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Fig. 9. The secrecy rate normalized by log of SNR in the asymptotic SNR
range.
value for different values of the residual self interference
power I. It is observed that as μ → ∞, the ratio of the
secrecy rate over the SNR in logarithmic value converges
to two for FD communication, even with advanced receiver
at Eve (indicated by IC + JD at Eve). On the other hand,
limμ→∞ max Slog(μ) approaches zero in the HD mode. Hence, the
reported respective sdof with FD and HD communication is
clearly evident from the presented trend.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK
A thorough analysis of the potential of full-duplex commu-
nication in enhancing the physical-layer security of a wireless
link is presented in this contribution. A closed form expression
for the ergodic secrecy rate has been derived considering the
Nakagami-m fading model. Single-user, and multi-user decod-
ing eavesdropper with successive interference cancellation and
joint decoding capabilities, are both considered. The finding is
presented as a function of the eavesdropper channel strength
and residual self interference power. A characterization of the
secrecy rate in the asymptotic high SNR regime, namely the
secrecy degrees of freedom, is also presented. Finally, com-
prehensive numerical results via simulations demonstrating
the validity of the derived results have been presented. The
analytical findings are found to closely match the simulation
results in all scenarios, thereby validating the accuracy of the
analysis and the presented results.
Contrary to the limited throughput gain potential, FD com-
munication is found to provide a high degree of physical-layer
security. Specifically, the ergodic secrecy rate with full-duplex
communication is found to grow linearly with the log of the
direct channel SNR as opposed to the flattened out secrecy
rate with conventional half-duplex communication, irrespec-
tive of the eavesdropper channel strengths. Such compelling
secrecy rates are found to be valid even with strong residual
self interference power and under moderate SNR conditions.
In fact, the sdof, i.e., the pre-log factor of the secrecy rate is
found to be two compared to that of zero with conventional
HD transmissions. As part of the future work, we plan to
extend our study by analysing other physical-layer security
metrics such as the secure outage probability and the strictly
positive secrecy probability, and consider a FD Eve with active
jamming capabilities.
APPENDIX A
DERIVATION OF THE ERGODIC SECRECY
RATE WITH HD COMMUNICATION
The achievable ergodic secrecy rate given by Eq. (12) can
be expanded as
S¯H D = log(e)
∫ ∞
0
ln(1 + x) fX (x)FY (x) dx︸ ︷︷ ︸
J1
+ log(e)
∫ ∞
0
ln(1 + y) fY (y)FX (y) dy︸ ︷︷ ︸
J2
− log(e)
∫ ∞
0
ln(1 + y) fY (y) dy︸ ︷︷ ︸
J3
. (28)
A. Evaluating J1
Substituting FY (y) = 1−exp(−y/φ) in Eq. (28), we obtain
J1 = log(e)
∫ ∞
0
ln(1 + x) (1 − exp(−x/φ)) fX (x) dx
= log(e)
∫ ∞
0
ln(1 + x) fX (x) dx︸ ︷︷ ︸
J11
− log(e)
∫ ∞
0
ln(1 + x) exp(−x/φ) fX (x) dx︸ ︷︷ ︸
J12
. (29)
Further substituting fX (x) given by Eq. (2) and isolating
the integral J11, we obtain
J11 = log(e)
∫ ∞
0
ln(1 + x)m
m xm−1
μm(m)
exp
(
−mx
μ
)
dx
= log(e)m
m
μm(m)
∫ ∞
0
xm−1G1,00,1
[
mx
μ
∣∣∣∣−0
]
G1,22,2
[
x
∣∣∣∣1, 11, 0
]
dx
= log(e)
(m)
G1,33,2
[
μ
m
∣∣∣∣1, 1, 1 − m1, 0
]
, (30)
where the last step is obtained following [38, eq. (21)].
Following similar steps, J12 in Eq. (29) is evaluated in terms
of the Meijer’s G function as
J12 =
∫ ∞
0
C (x)
mm xm−1
μm(m)
exp
(
−
(
m
μ
+ 1
φ
)
x
)
dx
=
(
1 + μ
mφ
)−m
ln(2)(m)
G1,33,2
[
μφ
mφ + μ
∣∣∣∣1, 1, 1 − m1, 0
]
. (31)
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B. Evaluating J2
The integral J2 in Eq. (12) can be expanded as
J2 =
∫ ∞
0
C (y)
1
φ
exp
(
− y
φ
)
γ (m, ym/μ)
(m)
dy
=
log(e)
∫ ∞
0 G
1,2
2,2
[
y
∣∣∣ 1,11,0
]
G1,00,1
[
y
φ
∣∣−
0
]
G1,11,2
[
my
μ
∣∣∣ 1m,0
]
dy
φ(m)
,
where the last step results from substituting the logarithm,
the exponential and the lower incomplete gamma functions
with their respective representation in terms of the Meijer’s G
function. The integral J2 can be expressed in closed form in
terms of the EGBMGF as
J2 = log(e)
(m)
G1,0:1,2:1,11,0:2,2:1,2
[
1
−
∣∣∣∣1, 11, 0
∣∣∣∣ 1m, 0
∣∣∣∣φ, mφμ
]
. (32)
C. Evaluating J3
The last integral J3 in Eq. (28), which reads J3 =
log(e)
φ
∫ ∞
0 ln(1+y) exp (−y/φ) can be solved following similar
steps as in Eq. (30) by substituting m = 1 and μ = φ. The
resulting expression for J3 is
J3 = log(e)G1,33,2
[
φ
∣∣∣∣1, 1, 01, 0
]
. (33)
APPENDIX B
DERIVATION OF THE ERGODIC SECRECY
RATE WITH FD COMMUNICATION
The average achievable secrecy rate of the Alice to Bob link
in FD mode given by Eq. (16) can be expressed as a sum of
integrals as follows
S¯F D,a =
∫ ∞
0
C (x) fγF D (x)Fβa (x) dx︸ ︷︷ ︸
K1
+
∫ ∞
0
C (u) fβa (u)FγF D (u) du︸ ︷︷ ︸
K2
−
∫ ∞
0
C (u) fβa (u) du︸ ︷︷ ︸
K3
.
(34)
D. Evaluating K1
Using Eqs. (2) and (7), the integral K1 in Eq. (16) can be
expanded as
K1 =
∫ ∞
0
C (x) fγF D (x) dx︸ ︷︷ ︸
K11
−
∫ ∞
0
C (x)e
(
− xφ
)(
1 + xψ
φ
)−1
fγF D (x) dx︸ ︷︷ ︸
K12
. (35)
Following the steps involved in evaluating J11, we have
K11 = log(e)
(m)
G1,33,2
[
μ˜
∣∣∣∣1, 1, 1 − m1, 0
]
. (36)
On the other hand, the second integral K12 can be expanded
as an integration involving a product of three Meijer’s G
functions; with a close form solution in terms of the EGBMGF
defined in Eq. (13) as follows
K12 =
∫ ∞
0
xm−1 exp
(
−
(
1
μ˜
+ 1φ
)
x
)
ln(1 + x)
ln(2)μ˜m(m)
(
1 + ψφ x
) dx
=
∫ ∞
0
G1,00,1
[(
1
μ˜ + 1φ
)
x
∣∣−
0
]
G1,22,2
[
x
∣∣∣ 1,11,0
]
G1,11,1
[
ψ
φ x
∣∣∣ 00
]
ln(2)μ˜m(m)x1−m
dx
=
(
1 + μ˜φ
)−m
G1,0:1,2:1,11,0:2,2:1,1
[
m
−
∣∣∣ 1,11,0
∣∣∣ 00
∣∣∣ μ˜φμ˜+φ , μ˜ψμ˜+φ
]
ln(2)(m)
,
(37)
where the second step follows from the relation (1 + cx)α =
1
(−α)G
1,1
1,1
[
cx
∣∣∣α+10
]
[38, eq. (10)].
E. Evaluating K2
Substituting the respective gamma CDF and the PDF of the
SINR β at Eve from Eq. (6), the integral K2 is expanded as
a product of four distinct terms that can be represented as
four different Meijer’s G functions. However, an integration
involving four terms of Meijer’s G function is not readily
solvable. To overcome this limitation, we proposed to restrict
the gamma parameter m to be a an integer. Please note,
the solution in the case of a non-integer m value can be
approximated by replacing m with its closest integer. In that
case, we can represent the CDF of γF D using the recurrence
relation γ (m + 1, x) = mγ (m, x) − xm exp(−x) for integer
positive m as γ (m, x) = (m)
(
1 − exp (−x)∑m−1n=0 xnn!
)
[35,
eq. (6.5.13)]. Subsequently, the integral K2 is solved as
K2 =
∫ ∞
0
C (u)
(
1 − exp
(
− u
μ˜
) m−1∑
n=0
un
μ˜nn!
)
fβa (u) du
= K3 − K ′2, (38)
where
K ′2 =
2∑
α=1
ψα
ψφ
m−1∑
n=0
μ˜−n
n!
∫ ∞
0
un ln(1 + u)
(
1 + ψφ u
)−α
exp
((
1
μ˜
+ 1φ
)
u
) du
=
2∑
α=1
ψα−1
φ
m−1∑
n=0
1
μ˜nn!
∫ ∞
0
unG1,00,1
[(
1
μ˜
+ 1
φ
)
u
∣∣∣∣−0
]
× G1,22,2
[
u
∣∣∣∣1, 11, 0
]
G1,11,1
[
ψ
φ
u
∣∣∣∣1 − α0
]
du
=
2∑
α=1
μ˜ψα−1
ln(2)(μ˜ + φ)
m−1∑
n=0
(
1 + μ˜φ
)−n
n!
× G1,0:1,2:1,11,0:2,2:1,1
[
n + 1
−
∣∣∣∣1, 11, 0
∣∣∣∣ 1 − α0
∣∣∣∣ μ˜φμ˜ + φ ,
μ˜ψ
μ˜ + φ
]
.
(39)
Substituting K1 and K2 into Eq. (34) yields the final
expression for S¯F D,a in Eq. (17).
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